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1 PREFATORY REMARKS 
This paper is an excerpt from by monographic dissertation which is to be completed by 
the end of March 2009. It exclusively deals with theoretical issues because although I 
have begun on the actual analysis, I have not written any whole empirical chapters yet. 
However, some preliminary empirical findings will be given at the presentation. 
2 ABSTRACT 
The paper outlines a theoretical framework for understanding reform-related 
opportunism in connection with current local government mergers in Denmark. The 
chain of reasoning is based on a local government version of the political business 
cycle. Where this model predicts cyclical financial patterns on reversible financial 
expenditures within each election period, the developed argument on local government 
mergers posits a pattern on non-reversible expenditures in the immediate years 
preceding them. The paper utilizes a theory-testing design with explanatory factors on 
two levels (individual and group level). This is achieved with the aid of insights from 
collective action theory. 
3 INTRODUCTION 
To use an old quote from Wildavsky, budgeting is the life blood of government and in 
his words the budget provides us with the annals of the great battle for the societal pie; 
or in Lasswell’s classical terms: the political struggle for who gets what, when and how. 
However, talk of the budget in singular seems ill guided at best, both generally and 
particularly in the case under investigation here, Denmark, where local authorities 
account for the torso, arms as well as the legs of the welfare state, figuratively speaking. 
As things would have it, Denmark is presently engaged in a complete remapping of her 
communal landscape, the second of its kind in the span of four decades; and like its 
predecessor reform (which came into effect on 1st April 1970), it also has local 
government mergers at its centre. In numerical terms, 236 of the 270 existing 
municipalities are currently merging into 64 new authorities, leaving 34 unaffected and 
giving a total of 98 new ones per 1st January 2007. Furthermore, the 14 current counties 
are merging into 5 new regional authorities within the same period of time. 
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Heading for the dustbin of has-beens can lead to decidedly myopic and 
short-sighted behavior in spite of its longer-term and societal consequences. 
Conversely, those whose existence remains unchallenged should not experience such a 
displacement between current and future interests as they will see the morning sun for 
the many days to come. This is an almost paradigmatic theme especially within the 
game-theoretical literature, where it typically is discussed in the form of one-shot and 
endgame situations or discounting inter alia modeled as backwards ‘unzipping effects’ 
when continued interaction is abruptly halted. Since the reasoning behind the argument 
is explicated later, let us here suffice to say that there are strong theoretical reasons for 
expecting actors’ time horizons to have a strong influence on their behavior1. On this 
background, I forward the following for theoretical deliberation and empirical 
investigation: 
Have the municipalities’ and counties’ taken to any financially opportunistic 
behavior in the years preceding the second local government reform? 
There is both a descriptive and an explanatory dimension in the question and this paper 
stresses the latter in the form of a theory-testing design. The temporal delimitation of 
the problematique is the fiscal period from 2003 to and counting 2006. For this is the 
timeframe in which it makes sense to expect reform speculation on the part of local 
government: as depicted in Figure 1 below, talk of reform was first sparked by the 
Prime Minister in his 2002 opening speech to Parliament on 1st October. At the same 
time, a Commission on Administrative Structure was appointed to assess whether the 
existing municipal and county structure was in need of an overhaul. 
                                                 
1 There are likewise strong empirical reasons which I will not delve into in this paper 
save for a brief note here: although the previous local government reform in 1970 
received little scholarly attention, there was also back then a considerable amount of 
uneasiness about opportunistic financial behaviour on the part of the local authorities in 
the years preceding the reform; and as one scholar notes, ”[b]y the first communal 
mergers there was not yet made sufficient financial safeguards in the conditions for the 
use of accumulated liquidity, which led to strange over-consumptions with the aim of 
securing that the money benefited the original population” (freely translated from 
Asmussen 2003). This presence of ‘strange overconsumptions’ in the last reform reveals 
a strong empirical relevance in relation to local financial behavior during the current 
reform. 
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Figure 1: Timeline on the Second Local Government Reform 
Then on 9th January 2004 the Commission publicized its findings which subsequently 
were used (rather selectively) as the basis for an agreement on a local government 
reform on 24th June.  The agreement stipulated that the municipalities should merge 
under the condition that the demographic base of the new authority be at least 20.000 
inhabitants (approx.); and further that the deadline for voluntary mergers was on 1st 
January 2005 (Indenrigs- og Sundhedsministeriet 2006a; Regeringen 2004)2. This gave 
the local authorities a window of opportunity for merging of roughly two years from the 
                                                 
2 As it turned out, all but four municipalities made use of the voluntary solution though 
all the mergers obviously had a mandatory element in them regardless of whether they 
were ‘voluntary’ or forced (Indenrigs- og Sundhedsministeriet 2006a). 
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first talk of reforms, and of about six months from when the actual agreement was 
reached. 
The incumbent government has been all too aware of incentives for local 
reform speculation, and has therefore instigated various countermeasures parallel to the 
aforementioned agreement so as to circumscribe any local financial wholesale; and the 
first measure was already put in place in December 2003 before the Commission 
published its findings. Among these countermeasures was also the institutional advent 
of temporary (municipal) integration and (county) preparation committees for the fiscal 
year of 2006: these were composed of the new authorities’ politicians (as elected the 
November 2005 local elections); and for competences they were granted wide financial 
powers of approval over their respective merging town or county councils in 2006, 
whose tenure was extended for a year after the 2005 elections. As explicated later, their 
advent arguably introduces an element of temporary bicameralism into the traditionally 
unicameral (read: sovereign) town and county councils; and the committees thus take on 
the role of powerful de jure second chambers. 
Nothing has so far been said on what constitutes financially opportunistic 
behavior. Its actual operationalization will be dealt with later but it is obviously reform-
related financial dispositions (read: speculation) of some sort. This begs the question of 
what ‘business as usual’ is supposed to be, as such non-reform-related behavior 
constitutes our base of comparison. 
4 WHERE YOU STAND, DEPENDS ON WHERE YOU SIT 
We expect politics to make a difference. However, we should not just look for 
differences along partisan lines as any decentralized system of government presupposes 
the marriage of two very difference logics: that of centrally held macroeconomic 
responsibility with (some degree of) local autonomy. As the caption cites Allison for 
having said (Allison and Zelikow 1999), it is reasonable to expect that actor behavior is 
shaped by where they sit: in this case behind a desk on Capitol Hill or in a town or 
county councils farther from the pinnacles of central power. If local authorities merely 
were a provincial extension of central government (as arguably is the case in, say, 
France), then it would be meaningful to characterize the central-local relationship as a 
delegation (principal-agent) problem. However, the Danish case is rather a situation of 
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strategic interaction between different but interdependent levels of government. On the 
one hand, the Danish local authorities enjoy autonomy from Capitol Hill; indeed it is 
constitutionally secured albeit this only pertains to their de jure existence3. On the other 
hand, their autonomy is less than absolute, as its scope being is dictated by the central 
powers. As Christensen et al notes on the matter: 
“The municipalities [and counties] are a part of the public administration 
and as such subordinate to Parliament. At the same time, the town [and 
county] councils are elected and therefore accountable to the local voters”, 
(freely translated from Christensen, Christiansen, and Ibsen 1999). 
So although part of the same public administration, the interests of central and local 
government are not the same. However, the functioning of each is necessary for the 
other and they exist in a relationship as complementary opposites: the local authorities 
accounting for the torso, arms and legs of the welfare state, and the central powers as its 
guiding head. This touches on the issue of voter accountability which likewise differs 
between the levels of government; as noted by the Danish Economic Council: 
“The Government will by the voters be held responsible for the overall 
economic development while the local politicians normally are judged by 
other criteria, for example communal taxes or the service level”, 
(freely translated from Økonomiske Råd 2002). 
This means that each level caters to different interests in different electorates, the local 
authorities’ voter population being a subset of the Government’s. Their performance is 
thus also assessed differently by Mr. and Mrs. John Q Taxpayer. Take the case of the 
local authorities: on the face of it, their expenditure levels on, say, child-care or road 
maintenance are, like many decisions, the end result of a vast number of decisions made 
within numerous areas by potentially just as many people (Pallesen 2003); in this sense, 
the life of local government seems quite similar to that of central government. However, 
the local authorities cater exclusively to the interests of their local electorates. As one 
scholar has noted: 
”What counts for the individual town [or county] council is not the economy 
in general. It is particularly considerations for the municipality [or county] 
and its economy. If you can get away with not paying then you do so 
gladly”, 
                                                 
3 Its content, the de facto scope that this autonomy affords the authorities, is however 
regulated centrally. 
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(freely translated from Andersen 2000b). 
One can even make the argument that local authorities are legally required only to take 
the interests of their local electorate into account – at least when no legal provisions 
exist stating otherwise; for as Andersen notes: 
”Whether the municipalities [or counties] can act without legal authority 
depends on the purpose of the task. The service must [, however,] 
exclusively benefit the local community”, 
(freely translated from Andersen 2000a; cursive omitted). 
Now take the viewpoint of central government. It will be held accountable for national 
issues such as overall public finances, which it can ill afford to be complacent about. 
For example, increases in local service provisions might be well received in the affected 
communities; but the government will quickly find its public support dwindling if those 
increases erode national goals for public expenditure levels, in which it has invested 
resources and prestige. In this way, a decentralized system of government presupposes 
the marriage of two very different logics at odds with each other: that of centrally held 
macroeconomic responsibility and (some degree of) local autonomy in the 
predominantly local service production and provision of the Danish welfare state4. From 
this perspective, adherence to national issues cannot be expected to arise automatically 
out of local self-interest. So Adam Smith’s invisible hand of auto-piloting self-interest 
might be a sufficient depiction of the functioning of markets (under certain conditions, 
of course); but a completely different, political logic is at work here – one that is 
premised on where you sit and thus in turn who you have to answer to. 
The chain of reasoning has until now been worded in terms of 
‘authorities’. But it is people who make decisions and not faceless entities, in our case 
elected politicians at central and local levels of government. The literature on the 
motivational factors of politicians is quite extensive, and it is not for me to review it 
here. However, two salient factors in the debates have been re-election (opportunism) 
and partisan (ideological) affiliation. The heretofore reasoning assumes politicians to be 
opportunistically motivated with their position on the levels of government prescribing 
what s/he is held accountable for and by whom; in this way, the politicians’ level of 
                                                 
4 Or welfare communes as they also have been called. 
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government determines whom the s/he owes his or hers allegiance to if seeking to be re-
elected. 
5 A THEORY ON BUSINESS AS USUAL: THE POLITICAL CYCLE 
So how does one go about getting re-elected locally and just what is ‘usual’ 
opportunistic behavior? As for the former question, there are legion different ways to 
sway the voters’ opinion in one’s favor, at least potentially. However, I delimit my 
attention to manipulating the temporal distribution of the costs and benefits of local 
government policies over the election period: i.e. local political (business) cycles5. This 
is assumed to be the means for securing the politicians’ goal of re-election. But how 
great is the financial autonomy of the town and county councils in making financial 
displacements within the election period? They obviously do not have the same policy 
instruments at their disposal as central government; indeed that is intentionally so inter 
alia to maintain centrally held macroeconomic responsibility. However, on the 
expenditure side they do have authority over local expenditures (read: service 
provision), at least to the extent that centrally imposed legal provisions do not mandate 
otherwise. The town and county councils’ autonomy also extends to the income side, 
where they inter alia have the right to set their own level of taxation, although also this 
has been subjected to centrally imposed restrictions over time (Mouritzen 1989). The 
local politicians thus have at least some room for manoeuvre in altering tax and 
expenditure levels within the election periods to their own gain6. 
As for the latter question, opportunistic behavior on the part of local 
politicians pertains to the timing of the policy changes on tax and expenditure levels as 
the means for the aim of political re-election. But this does not necessarily say anything 
about the prudence of the policy changes themselves, financially or otherwise7. 
                                                 
5 Business in parentheses as it is a misleading term in the context of local government, 
the reason being the restricted policy instruments at the town and county councils’ 
disposal (Mouritzen 1991). 
6 However, they have little by way of influencing their local private sectors (Mouritzen 
1989). 
7 This might not hold up if, say, tax cuts were financed via borrowing. However, it does 
seem sensible to restrict the understanding of opportunism strictly to the timing of the 
policy changes. Furthermore, the particular case of borrowing to finance tax cuts 
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However, it might be related to some types of expenditures and policy areas as 
discussed later. 
In Denmark, local politicians are elected for a four-year fixed-term period 
and as seen in Figure 2 below, the local political cycle leads us to expect contractive 
financial policy changes in the beginning of the election period in the form of 
(electorally unpopular) tax hikes, the fully drawn curves, or cuts in expenditure levels 
(read: service provision), the dashed curves. Conversely, we should see expansive 
policy changes in the end of the election period in the form of tax cuts and increases in 
local expenditures (service provision)8. The intersection between these two periods and 
their differing financial expectations (the dotted vertical lines) reveals the central 
assumption behind the model’s chain of reasoning: that voter memory is assumed to be 
relatively short and restricted to the end of each election period9. 
                                                                                                                                               
probably holds little explanatory value in the Danish case as the raising of loans by local 
governments is heavily restricted and earmarked for specific purposes. 
8 The actual slope of the curves is left to a matter of empirical investigation and so the 
sine-shaped curves of Figure 2 are merely used as a matter of exposition. 
9 The point of intersection need not lie at the temporal centre of the election period so 
the two periods need not be equally long. That they have been drawn as such in Figure 2 
is purely a matter of exposition. Also, the point of intersection can very well differ from 
one local authority to the next and is best left to empirical investigation. 
One problem in the figure is that it does not take a one-year time lag into 
account in the local governments policy changes. This is due to the fact that local 
government must, like all public authorities, adopt budgets in advance, to be precise on 
15 October each year at the latest. It is necessary to incorporate such a ‘reaction lag’ and 
this will be remedied at a later point in time. 
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Figure 2: The local political cycle 
Every year is thereby an election year in the local political cycle, in the sense that 
behavior in interim years serves a purpose in regard to the election years: either you are 
saving up or you are spending to bolster public support10. However, this does not mean 
that the politicians’ time horizon can be restricted to any given election period in itself. 
They still have to look beyond the current period, for as Easton noted long ago: 
“If the authorities sought to meet all grievances over past outputs greater 
discomfort might well be in store for the members. The authorities would 
thereby be creating future conditions militating against the growth of 
specific support. This is just one way of formulating the short-run instead of 
the long-run problem that must constantly plague all political authorities. 
Response to demands for increases in expenditures in any area… must all be 
balanced against probable wants, demands and grievances of members in 
the future. The authorities cannot discount the future entirely; to do so 
would at least expose them to the possibility of future incapacity to meet 
demands”, 
(Easton quoted in Mouritzen 1991; cursive added). 
So you restrict spending to ensure something along the lines of long-term cost neutrality 
over the election period or periods (; otherwise you would be re-elected to a bankrupt 
                                                 
10 Given that the local political cycle here is modeled according to policy changes, it 
implicitly assumes that voters think in relative terms; that is, that they assess the 
politicians less according to long-term, absolute tax and service levels and more on 
short-term positive or negative changes in those levels. For example, this means 
assuming that a voter is less interested in whether s/he thinks that a municipality’s child 
care policy is adequately funded, and more interested in whether the policy area lately 
has received any additional funding. 
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authority that with all probability would be put under central administration.) This can 
be visualized in Figure 2 by drawing an imaginary line through the curves’ point of 
intersection in each election year: savings from the beginning of the election period 
amount to spending at its end (at least approximately)11. 
Maintaining a long-term capacity to meet voter demands also presupposes 
reversibility or non-permanence in the policy changes, which means that we can relate 
our expectations to expenditure type: we should expect the policy changes to occur on 
expenditures for operations which can be renegotiated yearly during the adoption of the 
local budgets (Juul and Kyvsgaard 2004). However, this is also necessary in the short 
term so as to be able to shift from contractive to expansive policy changes over the 
election period. Conversely, expenditures on construction are non-reversible and also 
carry derived expenditures on inter alia operations and maintenance which are likewise 
hard to reverse. Furthermore, we can differentiate between the political salience of 
different policy areas, as the reasoning in the local political cycle is premised on 
political re-election: policy changes should thus be expected in high profile policy areas 
such as child care and not in low-key areas such as road maintenance which are less 
visible and tangible by the voter population. This means that we can make the models’ 
expectations narrower that what was formulated initially, at least regarding the 
expenditure side.  
The recurring importance of political re-election as explicated above is the 
ever-present context (read: base of comparison) that my problematique should be 
understood in relation to; and the relevant timeframe to consider is from the 2001 local 
elections preceding the second local government reform to the first elections after the 
reform in 2009. The crucial question is how the ‘external shock’ of the local 
government reform has affected the local governments’ behavior in the pre-reform years 
(from 2003 to and counting 2006) relative to what we would expect from the local 
political cycle12. 
                                                 
11 The model thus assumes that local tax and expenditure levels remain constant over 
the long run across election periods. But this is empirically far from the case in 
Denmark as well as in a host of other polities. However, this issue is not important to 
the extent that one examines relative policy changes within each election period. 
12 External in the sense that the local government reform very much was a top-down 
project by central government. 
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6 A THEORY ON THE ECONOMICS OF GOING OUT OF BUSINESS 
Having now explicated ‘usual’ opportunistic behaviour, how are we to define the 
‘unusual’ reform-related opportunism? It has to be understood in relation to the central-
local relationship and local political cycle explicated above. As for the latter, the cycle 
is an expression of ‘business as usual’ and as such unrelated to the local government 
mergers. However, the local governments’ financial behaviour in the years preceding 
the reform has to be understood relative to the logic of the cycle. In other words, the 
goal of political re-election (to which local policy changes is the means) cannot merely 
be understood as a function of the amount of time until the next election year. Re-
election thereby also comes to depend on the effects of the mergers, which alters the 
very rules of the game for the politicians. It actually becomes a different game with new 
players (read: political opponents) in a brand new and larger ballpark (read: electorate). 
So if the argument is that politicians seeking to be re-elected should adhere to the local 
political cycle under ordinary circumstances, then what does it take to get re-elected 
when facing a merger in the near-future? 
To start us off, let us situate the issue at hand within the central local relationship: as the 
argument from Chapter 4 goes, it makes a fundamental difference whether you sit 
behind a desk on Capitol Hill or in one of the town or county councils, the reason being 
that each has to cater for different concerns and interests in different electorates; and so 
their respective perspectives on what opportunism constitutes will likewise differ. As 
Blom-Hansen notes in relation to the current reform and incentives for local financial 
wholesale before “closing time”: 
”…no local politician apparently wishes to enter into a regional [read: 
merged] municipality with a full coffer. The money has also been collected 
from the municipality’s inhabitants and should therefore be used for their 
benefit”, 
(freely translated from Blom-Hansen 2005). 
From the perspective of local government, opportunistic behaviour can thus be seen as 
nothing short of local acts of patriotism purely on moral grounds. However, it can 
likewise be understood as pertaining to political re-election as prescribed in the local 
political cycle in the previous chapter (see Figure 2 on page 9), as do I. At any rate, 
central government can be expected to have quite a different take on the matter, as they 
cater to different concerns in the national electorate: the local councils may (and 
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arguably should) be quite indifferent about the country’s financial state of affairs, for 
which they are not held accountable13. However, central government will and can thus 
ill afford to stand idly by while local authorities engage in financial wholesale. In this 
way, defining opportunistic financial behaviour as opportunistic in the first place lends 
itself to the central government’s view on the matter (; and perhaps this view is also 
shared by a subset of the local politicians, as will be explicated in Chapter 6.4.) In the 
words of the Ministry of the Interior and Health, opportunistic behaviour amounts to 
”...arrangements made by the existing municipalities and counties that 
directly or indirectly can affect the possible arrangements of future 
municipalities and regions, and where these arrangements would not have 
been made or would have had a different content, provided the new units 
had had power of authority”, 
(freely translated from Indenrigs- og Sundhedsministeriet 2006c). 
This phrasing pertains to the fiscal year 2006 where the integration and preparation 
committees were in operation. However, it is of little use as a definition of opportunistic 
behavior which it defines counterfactually relative to what the new (2005 elect) town 
and county councils would have done if put in their place. Instead, opportunism in 
relation to the reform should be defined relative to the ordinarily expected opportunism 
of the local political cycle. But how are we to separate ordinary and reform-related 
opportunism? Politicians acting opportunistically under normal (non-reform) 
circumstances take the long-term capacity to meet voter demands into consideration, 
this by ensuring reversibility in their financial behavior over the election period (cf. 
page 10). However, politicians taking to opportunism when facing local government 
mergers should conversely seek non-reversibility in their financial dispositions. The 
reason is that the electorate of local politicians in merging authorities is expanded to 
encompass all the merging units. However, who says that their electoral base is 
similarly expanded and evenly distributed in the new electorate? On the contrary, the 
local politicians arguably do best by assuming that their power base (read: electoral 
support) remains concentrated within the boundaries of their old authority, at least in the 
                                                 
13 Central government could likewise argue along moral lines, say, that the marginal 
gain of each publicly spent dollar should not be lower because of the local government 
reform; that is, local government should not spend public means simply to keep the cash 
in the local area. Instead, it should consider all expenditures in the manner that it would 
have done if there had been no reform. 
Page 13 
short term14. And so local politicians in merging authorities can be expected to engage 
in what is traditionally dubbed ‘parish politics’ by providing their local areas with 
preferential treatment at the detriment of longer-term and societal considerations. The 
advantage of non-reversibility it that such financial dispositions cannot be overturned in 
the merged authority’s future yearly budgetary negotiations. So you actively engage in 
creating sunk costs in your local electorate to win their favor, costs only reversible at 
great expense to the new, merged authority. Such parochial sentiments have even 
(unintentionally) been aided by statutory provisions for the 2005 local elections which 
stipulate that the politicians’ local origin may be stated on the ballot paper (Indenrigs- 
og Sundhedsministeriet 2005; Indenrigs- og Sundhedsministeriet 2006b). 
6.1 THE EFFECTS OF MERGING  
The imminent demise of the great majority of municipalities and counties means that 
the shadow of the future in the merging units becomes a decidedly sunny affair. In other 
words, the discount factors of the merging authorities become markedly lower than 
those of the non-merging ones. The model presented in the following is a simple 
bivariat, unidirectional and positive causality as illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Reform-related opportunism and merging 
Merging is defined dichotomously as Mi = {0; 1} = {no, yes} and the heretofore chain 
of reasoning leads us to expect that merging authorities have increased their non-
reversible expenditures, Ni, more than the non-merging units15. These policy changes 
are calculated relative to when the authorities became aware that mergers were 
underway; and as elaborated in Chapter 3, that point in time was between 1st October 
2002 where talk of reform was initiated and 24th June 2004 where the deadline for 
                                                 
14 It will not be considering whether voters realign over the long run and re-focus from 
their old local area to the new municipality’s boundaries, as this falls outside the 
problematique’s timeframe. 
15 Non-reversible expenditures will be operationalized inter alia with expenditures on 
construction and borrowing. However, I will also include financing sources such as 
consumption of accumulated liquidity and the sale of buildings. 
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voluntary mergers became known. However, regardless of the specific date the policy 
changes are calculated as: 
 i, t 847, 2003i, t 847, 2003
i, t 1 847, 2002
N N
N ,   e.g  N
N N÷
Δ = Δ = , (4.1) 
where i denotes the local authorities’ numerical designation. Furthermore, t and t ÷ 1 
respectively denote (not necessarily consecutive) points in time after (t) and prior to the 
mergers became known (t ÷ 1). The example above shows just one possible 
operationalization and what fits best is a matter of empirical investigation. 
 It is important at this point to comment on the definition of reform-related 
opportunism as non-reversible expenditures: such expenditures are of course used on an 
ordinary basis as an essential part of local government. Examples would include the 
construction of a new school, a road extension or a home for the elderly. This can be 
financed in a host of ways such as increasing taxes, borrowing, using accumulated 
liquidity or a combination. So there are ordinary and reform-related non-reversible 
expenditures. However, we can differentiate between the two types by looking at policy 
changes; at least if we assume that ordinary non-reversible expenditures more or less 
are constant over time. This seems sensible inter alia because opportunistic policy 
changes can be expected to be of quite a large magnitude. 
 The heretofore chain of reasoning can be applied synchronously or 
diachronically, and the former leads us to expect that the merging authorities’ policy 
changes on non-reversible expenditures have been greater than in the non-merging 
units: 
 i, t 1, merging i, t 1, non mergingN N , and÷ ÷ −Δ = Δ  
 i, t , merging i, t , non mergingN N .−Δ > Δ   
(4.2) 
(4.3) 
The equality firstly states that we expect no differences in the policy changes between 
the merging and non-merging units prior to when the mergers became known to the 
authorities. However the inequality states that we do expect a difference after, with the 
merging units’ policy changes exceeding those of the non-merging ones. It should be 
noted that these two statements are intimately related as the second is premised on the 
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first holding up. Otherwise we cannot ascribe any explanatory power to the effect of the 
mergers as a factor on its own. 
 Secondly, we can apply the chain of reasoning diachronically by analyzing 
each merging authority’s policy changes on non-reversible expenditures before and after 
it learned that it was to be merged. Specifically, we would expect that 
 i, t , merging i, t 1, mergingN N .÷Δ > Δ  (4.4) 
6.2 FROM POLITICIANS TO GROUP POLITICS 
Our expectations for variation in reform-related opportunism have so far solely been 
premised on whether the local authorities are merging with other units or not. However, 
we can introduce several further dimensions along which opportunism should vary 
among the merging units. In this chapter, the black box of local government is opened 
up by examining characteristics of these local polities which might have an impact on 
the interests in, and opportunity for, reform-related opportunism. 
 The merging authorities have until now been treated as an exogenous and 
undifferentiated size. But they differ internally according to a host of factors including 
political ones, which are the focus of this chapter. Firstly, re-election has been the 
pivotal factor in the chain of reasoning developed so far. But what behavior are we to 
expect on the part of the not re-elected politicians? Can they be expected to remain 
passive or have they interests of their own that could be expected to circumscribe or 
exacerbate reform-related opportunism? One can here argue along several lines16 but the 
most sensible argument is, that if we expect re-elected politicians to resort to reform-
related opportunism then non re-elected ones should do the opposite; otherwise re-
election holds little in the way of explanatory value. This implies that if our model is 
correct, then we should expect the share of re-elected politicians in a given merging 
authority, Pi, to have an impact on reform-related opportunism in that unit: 
 
Figure 4: Reform-related opportunism and re-elected politicians 
The share can be formulated as a linear expectation calculated in percent as 
                                                 
16 e.g. a moral obligation to see locally collected taxes spent for the benefit of the local 
(voter) population cf. the quote from Blom-Hansen on page 11. 
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 ii
i
RP 100
T
= ⋅ , where 
 Ri is the number of re-elected councillors, and 
 Ti is the total number of councillors. 
(4.5) 
However, majoritarian decision rules are commonplace in polities around the world and 
the Danish town and county councils are no exception, as they prescribe to simple 
majority. Therefore it seems more prudent to forward a nonlinear, ‘lumpy’ expectation: 
reform-related opportunism should be exacerbated in merging authorities where the re-
elected politicians constitute a majority in the town or county council. This can be 
coded dichotomously by dividing Pi by 100 and rounding off to zero digits (; for 
example, a majority of 54 % in a council would be divided by 100 yielding .54 and then 
rounded off to 1, and vice versa)17.  
A second potentially salient political factor in the merging authorities is 
whether a town or county council is dominated by a single party or stable coalition, 
compared to a more fragmented polity plagued by all the vices of minority government. 
As Mouritzen notes, this can be expected to make a difference in the local political 
cycle, as an absolute majority or majority coalition is less dependent on building public 
support compared to a minority (1991). However, can we expect reform-related 
opportunism to vary among the merging authorities relative to polity fragmentation? 
Yes we can to the extent that a fragmented council expects to be further weakened in the 
                                                 
17 As it is required that number of councilors in a town or county council is odd between 
9 and 31, the re-elected politicians will by definition constitute a minority or a majority. 
 An alternative operationalization would be mayoral and not councilor re-
election, coded dichotomously as {0, 1} = {no, yes}. It might be appropriate here to 
delve into why the mayoralty might have a significant impact on reform-related 
opportunism: generally speaking, mayors, often referred to as ‘city kings’ by the 
political punditry, hold a formidable position in Danish local politics for several 
reasons: most importantly, they are near-impossible to remove from office in between 
elections (Christensen and Espersen 1983) in all but the most exceptional circumstances 
cf. § 7, subsection 2, and § 66 of the Communal Administration Act. The problematic 
aspects of this near-political immunity became all too clear in the spring of 2002 with 
the case of one of the more controversial mayors in Denmark: Peter Brixtofte. Secondly, 
the mayor is often the only local politician employed full time which in several ways 
gives him or her advantages over the remaining town or county councillors. However, it 
will discard this operationalization here and instead include it as an alternative in the 
empirical investigations. 
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larger council for the merged authority. Conversely, a dominant party or coalition 
should be expected to be relatively less affected by the merger. Such a measure on 
polity fragmentation can be operationalized as the concept of effective parties, EPi, 
borrowed from research on electoral systems (Elklit 2004). The measure is calculated as 
 i 2
x
1EP
p
= ∑ , where 
 px is the relative size of party x represented in 
 the council 
(4.6) 
By dividing 1 with the sum of each party’s squared relative size in authority, you get a 
measure for the effective number of parties, which should be interpreted in the 
following manner: 
”…[I]n a party system with two equally strong parties, the effective number 
of parties is exactly 2.0; for three equal parties it is 3.0; for two strong 
parties and one weaker party, it will be somewhere in the neighborhood of 
2.5”, 
(Lijphart 1990)18. 
The expectation is therefore again a positive, univariat causality between fragmentation 
and reform-related opportunism: 
 
Figure 5: Reform-related opportunism and polity fragmentation 
So we expect the partition of a council into (effective) parties to affect reform-related 
opportunism. 
6.3 RATIONAL MAN, IRRATIONAL SOCIETY: GROUP EFFECTS 
Expectations for variation in reform-related opportunism has until now been created 
among the old, pre-reform authorities (denoted by the subscript i), and sensibly so; for 
this is the analytical unit in the heretofore chain of reasoning. However, explaining 
                                                 
18 It should be noted that EPi is a measure of legislative polity fragmentation in the 
sense that it is calculated on the basis of the parties represented in the town or county 
councils (i.e. the local party system). However, one could alternatively construct a 
measure on the locally governing incumbency denoting the size of the local mayoral 
coalition relative to council size. However, I will let this be a matter for future 
consideration. 
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opportunism is arguably premised on including an additional level of analysis; and this 
level is the new, merged authorities (denoted by the subscript j) cf. Figure 6 below. 
 
Figure 6: Levels of analysis 
N-level analyses have over the years risen in popularity within the social sciences, and 
is affiliated with the works of such scholars as Putnam (1988) and Moravcsik (1998) in 
the field of international politics. However, the model proposed here is based on 
collective action theory originating from Olson  (1971) and which since then has been 
extended by scores of scholars. The individual level is at the level of the 236 merging 
authorities whereas the group level is the 64 new, merged authorities. Of course, multi-
level explanations require statistical techniques that allow for a hierarchical data 
structure, and the reader should keep this in mind when reading this chapter. 
Applying the Olsonian framework on reform-related opportunism entails 
defining the local government mergers as a collective action problem. This has not been 
necessary until now as we only have worked with explanatory factors related to the 
individual authorities. However, the collective consequences of their individual actions 
become visible at the group level. Specifically, the merging authorities have collective 
action problems with regards to securing the new authorities a sound financial standing 
at their moment of (re-)birth on 1. January 2007. However, as elaborated earlier 
politicians seeking re-election have strong incentives to engaging in reform-related 
opportunism by increasing non-reversible expenditures in their respective merging 
authorities. Adhering to individually rational behavior might thus lead to a collectively 
irrational outcome: the near or actual bankruptcy of the new authority that they are 
trying their best to get elected to. As the reader probably is aware of, this situation is the 
classical (N-person’s) Prisoners’ Dilemma as illustrated on the Pareto frontier below. 
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Figure 7: Prisoners’ Dilemma on the Pareto frontier 
The PD game is modeled with ordinal payoffs in the oft-used nomenclature of T for 
Temptation, P for Punishment, R for Reward and S for Sucker payoff (for example, see 
Axelrod 1984). The game is modeled with two players for the sake of exposition, and 
the preference ordering of each is T > R > P > S as marked out on each of the axes. The 
Nash equilibrium of the game is mutual defection resulting in the outcome (P, P) which 
is Pareto inferior to the outcome of mutual cooperation, (R, R) lying on the Pareto 
frontier. Actor 1 thus loses out by the amount of R ÷ P equaling a1 and actor 2 likewise 
with a loss of b1. The two remaining outcome, (T, S) and (S, T), are dealt with shortly in 
relation to the effect of group asymmetry. 
 Olson’s classical argument concerns the effect of group size: 
”…unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless 
there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in 
their common interest, rational self-interested individuals will not act to 
achieve their common or group interests”, 
(Olson 1971; cursive original). 
So in the absence of coercion or ‘special devices’ we should expect the larger, merged 
authorities to have a collective action problem on their hands, this in the form of an 
abysmal financial standing. We define group size as the number of merging authorities 
in each new unit. This leads to an expectation of a positive causal connection between 
group size, GSi, j, and reform-related opportunism: 
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Figure 8: Reform-related opportunism and group size 
Figure 9 shows the group size frequencies for the 236 merging municipalities (not 
counties which are omitted from visualization). As can be seen, the typical new, merged 
municipality is based on 3-4 authorities. But how large should a merger be in order to 
experience collective action problems? For instance, is a group of 3 merging 
municipalities ‘quite small’, in Olson’s words? It is hard to define a numerical boundary 
between small and large groups that is not arbitrarily chosen; and so it is left to a matter 
of empirical investigation whether reform-related opportunism varies along group size 
or not. 
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Figure 9: Group size frequencies (N = 236) 
Group asymmetry is according to Olson a possible solution to collective action 
problems. One of the persisting conclusions from Olson’s work has been the 
counterintuitive ”…tendency for the “exploitation” of the great by the small” (Olson 
1971). The argument is that collective action problems can be solved by somebody 
picking up the tab or providing a free lunch, if one will; that is, by distributing the costs 
of securing the collective good unevenly to the detriment of the group’s larger 
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members19. This is done out of pure self-interest as the larger member has a larger stake 
in the collective good (; of course, this rests on the assumption that the good has a 
structure facilitating differently sized members to gain differently sized benefits from its 
provision. Otherwise group asymmetry should have no alleviating effect on collective 
action problems.) The asymmetry is visualized in Figure 7 above where Actor 1 is the 
larger exploited member and Actor 2 the smaller free-rider. The resulting outcome (S, 
T) lies on the Pareto frontier and thus secures the collective good; but Actor 1 pays the 
price of R ÷ S equaling a2, while Actor 2’s free-riding results in an additional payoff of 
b2. We are therefore here faced with a matter of both (Pareto) efficiency and equity. 
So can some merging authorities look to other units in their group to hold 
back on reform-related opportunism? The answer seems to be yes: an asymmetrical 
factor with potential explanatory power is the size of the merging authorities’ 
electorates relative to that of their new, merged units. Although this factor’s unit of 
analysis is at the individual level, it is still a factor calculated from the group level. The 
argument is that size matters based on the importance of political re-election; and we 
would expect reform-related opportunism to vary according to the size of each merging 
authority’s electorate relative to the size of their new, merged electorate: 
 
Figure 10: Reform-related opportunism and relative electoral size 
Unlike the previous explanatory factors we here have a negative causality between 
electoral size and reform-related opportunism. This can be clarified with an example: 
the hypothetical merger of a large and small authority would lead us to expect less 
opportunism in the former relative to in the latter. The reason is simply that the 
incentive for opportunism in the large authority would be much weaker than in the 
smaller, because it would dominate in the new, merged unit. It would therefore not think 
it necessary to increase its non-reversible expenditures prior to the merger, as it would 
be in a dominating, hegemonic position in the new authority. The measure is calculated 
(in percent) in the following manner: 
                                                 
19 Or as Malnes puts it, free-rider incentives do not necessarily influence all group 
members with the same force (1983). 
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 i, ji, j
j
E
ES 100
ME
= ⋅ , where 
 Ei, j is the size of the authority i’s voter population, and 
 MEj is the size of the new, merged authority j’s voter 
 population. 
(4.7) 
As also discussed earlier in relation to the measure on councilor re-election, this is a 
very linear understanding of the explanatory power of electoral size on reform-related 
opportunism. One can likewise here use more majoritarian measures, say, whether the 
authority’s voter population constitutes more than half of the new, merged electorate. 
However, I have yet to elaborate such measures and thus refrain from considering them 
here. 
However, there is another possible solution to collective action problems, 
namely that of institutional design (third-party, external enforcement) which is the 
subject of the next chapter. 
6.4 COUNTERING LOCAL CARPE DIEM: COMMUNAL BICAMERALISM 
”The Constitution of 1953 abolished the [Danish] 
bicameral system… In Germany, the bicameral system’s 
double principle of representation is secured 
constitutionally. In Denmark, it was [de facto] reinstated 
with the local government reform in 1970”, 
(freely translated from Christensen 1998). 
Family additions are typically joyous occasions which, on the face of it, should make 
the local authorities ecstatic about the second local government reform; for they have 
been blessed with a bigger brother, albeit only temporarily for the fiscal year of 2006. 
But perhaps there is, in Shakespeare’s words, something rotten in the state of Denmark 
– or at least that might well be the local authorities’ take on the arrival of their new 
sibling. As this chapter will elaborate, the central powers at be have for 2006 taken to 
the sport of heresthetics (Riker 1986) and tinkered not only with the scope of the 
authorities’ financial autonomy. No they have crawled into the black box of local 
government and altered the decision-making system in the merging units.  
As Christensen as well as others have noted, Denmark might formally have 
abandoned bicameralism in 1953 but it was de facto reinstated following the local 
government reform in 1970 (see Blom-Hansen 2002;and Christiansen 2000). This very 
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much has to do with the tendency for minority governments in Denmark that, given the 
lack of clear parliamentary majorities, have bolstered themselves by involving the local 
authorities’ organizations as a de facto first chamber20. The second local government 
reform has likewise introduced an additional bicameral system, now at municipal level 
and albeit only temporarily for the fiscal year of 2006. This means that the merging 
authorities’ traditional ‘unicameralism’, the town and county councils’ local 
sovereignty, is circumscribed for 2006 by ‘bigger brothers’ in the form of municipal 
integration and county preparation committees (and in some cases also by the Ministry 
of the Interior and Health, MIH)21. The former is thus reduced to a first chamber with 
the latter acting as powerful de jure second chambers. This ‘strategizing in the large’ by 
the Government was laid down in the agreement on the local government reform: 
“In order to ensure proper preparation of the merger of municipalities, the 
district councils elected in the merged municipalities as a result of the local 
government election on 15 November 2005 will act as integration 
committees in 2006”, 
(Indenrigs- og Sundhedsministeriet 2006a; cursive added). 
The bicameral system thus functions by pitting some of the municipalities up against the 
remaining ones, although the dividing line actually isn’t found between authorities but 
rather within each of them22. We are here touching on the pivotal issue of political re-
election23. As noted in Chapter 3 (on page 4), the committees are composed of the new 
authorities’ politicians as elected the November 2005 local elections. The reason for 
introducing this temporary institutional superstructure is that it is in the fiscal year of 
                                                 
20 The National Association of Municipalities and The Danish Regions. 
21 Notice that this temporary two-chamber system violates Montesquieu’s lessons on the 
division of power due to its overlapping membership. However, it is in line with the 
Danish parliamentary tradition similar to the Westminster tradition of 
parliamentarianism, where members can hold seats in both the legislature and in the 
executive. 
22 Financial responsibility is thus decentralized to the merging authorities that are 
affected by it. We can therefore say that the new units are forces to internalize their own 
externalities created through reform-related opportunism within their respective 
merging groups. 
23 My argument here relies on the decision rule in the committees not being unanimity 
but some kind of majority rule, here simple majority which can be calculated in the 
basis of the number of seats divided by two + 1. However, what about the mayoralty’s 
power in the committee? Is it reneged to one mayor, one vote, as the committees inter 
alia hold no direct agenda-setting powers. 
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2006 that the municipal past stands face to face with its future, as it functions as a 
transitional year from the old to the new municipal division. As the Ministry of the 
Interior and Health notes on the competences of the bigger brothers: 
“By decisions to intervene in budgets etc. must be undertaken by weighing 
considerations for the existing municipality/county against considerations 
for the new unit and the general level of expenditures. The arrangements are 
established with the purpose of avoiding inexpediencies for the new units, 
but does not on the other hand entail a general transfer of decision-making 
authority and financial management to the integration and preparation 
committees etc.”, 
(freely translated from Indenrigs- og Sundhedsministeriet 2006c). 
The point is that because 2006 is the death bed for the old municipalities and year zero 
for the new ones, the interests of both has to be taken into account. In this way the 
Danish communal landscape has with a stroke been transformed into 64 bicameral 
systems at municipal level and 5 at county level, one for each group of merging 
authorities. Drawing on classical concepts from budgeting theory, we can say that re-
elected politicians in 2006 take on the role of budgetary guardians against expenditures 
instead of acting as advocates for expenditures (for example, see Brunsson 1989). There 
is here a clear parallel to the expectations from the local political cycle, which expects 
contractive policy changes in the immediate years after an election; and 2006 is the first 
year of the current local election period (as the tenure of the old town and county 
councils was extended for a year after the 2005 elections). 
 To be sure, the second chambers’ are fitted out with more than a rubber 
stamp, as they have been granted de jure veto right but no (direct) agenda-setting 
powers. So they might not be able to impose any decisions or expenditures of their own 
on the merging municipalities in their group, but they can severely circumscribe the 
municipalities’ decisions. A veto is by definition is reactionary, at least formally (for the 
moment leaving out possible preventive and anticipatory effects). This gives us the 
sequential time perspective in the two chambers’ decision-making powers, by which the 
first chamber’s decisions are known to the second chambers, but not vice versa. 
However, it the former can be expected to anticipate the behavior of the latter if we 
introduce a few sensible assumptions (qua the classical rollback argument). Stated in 
game-theoretical terms, the situation of a given merging authority i that is part of the 
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new authority j can be modeled as an extensive form game with complete and perfect 
information cf. Game 1 below24. 
 
Game 1: Structure of the Bicameral System 
The situation is modeled as a two-person game between each merging authority Ai, j, 
and its respective bigger brother, Cj or the MIH. The assumption of perfect information 
rests on the aforementioned sequential structure in the actors’ behavior. As for the 
assumption of complete information, it entails that each actor is assumed to know who 
the other actors are, their possible choices of strategy, and knowledge of their payoffs 
and thus also their preference orderings (Gates and Humes 1997). As for the authorities’ 
possible choices of strategy it is for now modeled as a dichotomous choice between 
resorting to reform-related opportunism or not. The committees likewise have a (more 
sensibly modeled) dichotomous choice between approving or rejecting the decisions of 
the aforementioned, owing itself de jure veto right and lack of agenda-setting powers. 
 So how does this institutional context alter our expectations to the 
authorities’ financial behavior in the years preceding the mergers? I have yet to develop 
the implications of this institutional change in game-theoretical terms. However the gist 
of the argument can be put in the following way: a classical argument on veto power is 
that its effect is seen in the very absence of its use. This leads us to expect that reform-
related will not become a problem in the fiscal year of 2006 as it is blocked by the 
committees. In sum, opportunism is expected to be rampant in the years 2003 to and 
counting 2005 but not in 2006.  
                                                 
24 No terminal nodes are included in the figure which therefore is not a game in the 
traditional sense. Instead, it merely visualizes the decision-making system in the 
merging authorities for 2006. 
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This institutional variation within the years preceding the reform 
furthermore opens up for testing a hypothesis related to the covertness in the 
opportunistic financial dispositions: if the merging authorities want to try to get away 
with reform-related opportunism in 2006 then they would have to engage in creative 
bookkeeping inter alia by re-posting expenditures between accounts. The budgetary 
system for Danish local government has some loopholes that the authorities might 
attempt to utilize: most important is the vague distinction between expenditures on 
operations (reversible) and constructions (non-reversible) which is less than clear (Juul 
and Kyvsgaard 2004); for example, replacing the tarmac on an existing road can equally 
be designated as an expenditure pertaining to construction or wear and tear and thus 
operations. I have yet to formalize the argument but covertness can be operationalized 
by creating measures for transfers between selected financial accounts. Increased 
transfer activity between accounts in 2006, defined relative to the remaining years 
leading up to the reform, would be evidence of such creative bookkeeping. 
6.5 A CONCLUDING REMARK 
It is worth noting that the base of comparison has shifted over the course of the paper: 
the expectations for variation in reform-related opportunism were initially modeled to 
vary between the merging and non-merging authorities (Chapter 6.1). Then, the base 
shifted to variation synchronously among the merging authorities, or diachronically 
within each authority over time, premised on political characteristics in these local 
polities (Chapter 6.2). These individual level factors were subsequently complemented 
with group level factors among the merging units informed by collective action theory 
(Chapter 0). Finally, the step was taken from behavioral expectations to the impact of 
institutional change with the conclusion that reform-related opportunism should occur 
prior to the fiscal year of 2006. This analytical pluralism has been sought actively by the 
author as it allows one to examine the same problematique from various angles. This 
arguably bolsters the validity and robustness of the empirical findings that will be 
undertaken at a later point in time. 
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